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The Global Transformation and IR 
 
During the 19th century, a ‘global transformation’ remade the basic 
structure of international order. This transformation was profound, 
involving a complex configuration of industrialization, rational state-
building and ideologies of progress.1 Because this transformation 
happened unevenly, it changed the distribution of power by generating a 
shift from a ‘polycentric world with no dominant centre’ to a ‘core-
periphery’ order in which the centre of gravity resided in the West 
(Pomeranz, 2000: 4). Acquiring the new configuration meant undergoing 
wide-ranging political, economic and cultural transformations, and 
polities that underwent those transformations held enormous 
advantages over those that did not. Although oscillations of power are 
nothing new in human history (Morris, 2010), the global transformation 
opened up a vastly expanded pool of resources, making the power gap 
both much bigger and much more difficult to emulate. In this sense, as 
well as marking a shift in the distribution of power, the global 
transformation also changed the basic sources, or mode of power,2 
stimulating the emergence of global modernity.3  
                                                 
1 By configuration, we mean a set of interlinked events and processes that 
concatenate in historically specific form. The basic assumption of this approach is 
that big events do not require big causes. Rather, social transformations arise from 
the conjunctural intersection of sequences of events and processes that are 
causally, but contingently, interrelated. On this issue, see Lebow (2010).  
2 By ‘mode of power’, we mean the material and ideational relations that are 
generative of both actors and the ways in which power is exercised. As we note 
above, during the global transformation, three dynamics (industrialization, rational 
statehood and ‘ideologies of progress’) combined to generate a new basis for how 
power was constituted, organized and expressed – we refer to this as a shift in the 
‘mode of power’. Contra most IR approaches, changes in the mode of power are 
more significant than changes in the distribution of power, effecting not just 
outcomes, but the basis for how interactions take place and are understood. We 
consider the consequences of thinking about power in this way in chapter 10.  
3 We outline what we mean by ‘global modernity’ later in this chapter. For now, it is 
worth noting that, for many social scientific disciplines, modernity serves as the basic 
foundation of their enquiry. In broadly Durkheimian terms, this transformation can be 
understood as a shift from social orders defined by stratificatory social differentiation 
to those dominated by functional differentiation. Stratification is about hierarchies of 
rank and class – it is characteristic of social orders defined by dynasticism and caste. 
Functional differentiation is about the coherence and interdependence of specialised 
types of activity, the creation of a complex division of labour, and the rise of legal, 
political, military, economic, scientific, religious, and other specialised roles. From 
this perspective, functional differentiation is the central characteristic of modernity 
Global modernity pulled the world into a single system, within 
which the consequences of the changes in the mode and distribution of 
power were widely and deeply felt. The world had been an economic 
international system since the European voyages of discovery during the 
15th and 16th centuries opened up sea-lanes around Africa, and across 
the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans (Buzan and Little, 2000: 96). Eurasia 
had been an economic system for two millennia. But the global ties 
binding such systems were thin, slow and limited in scope. Not until the 
19th century did the world become a global system in which core states 
could quickly and decisively project the new mode of power around the 
world. In this way, multiple regional international systems were engulfed 
in a full international system in which all parts of the world were closely 
connected not just economically and culturally, but also in military-
political terms (Buzan and Little, 2000; Osterhammel, 2014: 392-402).4  
If the first effect of the global transformation was to foster the 
emergence of a full international system, the second effect was to 
generate a host of new actors: rational nation-states, transnational 
corporations, and standing intergovernmental and nongovernmental 
organizations became leading participants in international affairs. Taken 
together, these changes in global structure and international actors 
meant that ‘the nineteenth century saw the birth of international relations 
as we know it today’ (Osterhammel, 2014: 393). Yet the discipline of IR 
pays surprisingly little attention to such changes. This book examines 
the reasons for IR’s failure to grasp the full significance of the global 
transformation and argues that this shortcoming creates major problems 
for how the discipline understands both itself and its subject matter.  
Our argument is that the global transformation generated four 
basic, but linked, types of change in international relations. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
(see Buzan and Albert, 2010; Albert and Buzan, 2011; Albert, Buzan and Zürn, 
2013). 
4 This prompts a supplementary question about what ‘international’ means. 
Sociologists tend to avoid this question by thinking of society as a unitary 
construction, while world historians usually have little sense of ‘the international’ as a 
distinct realm. In IR, thinking about ‘the international’ tends to start, even if it does 
not finish, with the issue of political multiplicity, whether this is understood as the 
‘logic of anarchy’, the ‘problem of difference’, or variants thereof. Our view, following 
Rosenberg (2006: 308), is that the international is ‘that dimension of social reality 
which arises specifically from the co-existence within it of more than one society’. 
Such a definition accepts the ‘fact’ of political multiplicity, but also stresses the 
importance of interactions between societies, whether these consist of the spread of 
ideas, the transfer of technologies, trading networks, security alliances, or practices 
of subjugation and emulation. The simultaneous existence of multiplicity and 
interactivity engenders a distinct field of enquiry – international relations.  
1. Industrialization and the extension of the market to a global scale 
produced major increases in interaction capacity, bringing all parts of 
the international system into closer contact with each other.5 At the 
same time, the new mode of power associated with industrialization 
and marketization produced major inequalities between societies. The 
result was a system that was simultaneously both intensely 
connected and deeply divided.  
 
2. The reconstitution of power associated with the emergence of 
modernity was sustained by processes of rational state-formation, in 
which capacities were both caged within nation-states and extended 
outwards into ‘alien spaces’. Nation building went hand-in-hand with 
imperialism. The result was a bifurcated international system in which 
rule-based order was reserved for ‘civilized’ peoples, and territorial 
annexation rendered for ‘barbarians’ and ‘savages’. This core-
periphery structure took global form, sustained by a large and durable 
power gap between those most enabled by the configuration of global 
modernity and those most disadvantaged by it.  
 
3. The new ideologies that rose to prominence during the 19th century, 
most notably liberalism, nationalism, socialism and ‘scientific’ racism, 
generated new entities, actors and institutions (e.g. settlers, civil 
society, limited companies) and either reconstituted old ones (e.g. the 
state), or undermined them (e.g. dynasticism). These ideologies, 
closely bound up with notions of progress, provided new legitimating 
strategies for how international relations was practiced.  
 
4. The tripartite configuration that lay behind the global transformation 
(industrialization, rational state-building and ideologies of progress) 
not only generated a core-periphery global order, but also 
destabilized great power relations by exposing the balance of power 
to the pressures of rapid technological and social change, with the 
consequence of making balancing dynamics much more volatile. 
Concerns about the rise and fall of those powers that harnessed – or 
failed to harness – modernity began in the 19th century. This dynamic 
remains a major feature of great power relations in the contemporary 
world.  
 
                                                 
5 Interaction capacity is defined as the physical and organizational capability of a 
system to move ideas, goods, people, money and armed force across the system 
(Buzan and Little, 2000: 80-84). This issue is discussed in depth in chapter 3.  
These changes need to be understood in relation both to what 
came before the global transformation and what came after. In terms of 
what came before, our argument is that the scale and depth of these 
changes amounted to a material and ideational transformation of the 
international system. The main changes that distinguish global 
modernity from previous periods in world history include the following: 
 
 Agrarian political economies based on land as wealth, and with cycles 
of prosperity and famine based on harvests, were superseded by 
industrial political economies based on capitalist accumulation, and 
featuring boom and bust trade cycles. At the same time, rapid and 
frequent technological transformations replaced slow and intermittent 
technological changes.6 
 Expectations of historical progress underpinned the emergence of 
industrial societies. New ideologies challenged personalized, 
composite polities and reshaped the territorial sovereign state by 
vesting sovereignty in the people and linking territory to the nation. 
 Rational states legitimized by these ideologies replaced absolutist 
polities, developing new bureaucratic structures that increased 
infrastructural capacities and provided the means for extending state 
power both at home and internationally.  
 The configuration of industrialization, rational state-building and 
ideologies of progress became the criteria by which great powers 
were defined.  
 As a result of this new configuration, a relatively even distribution of 
global power was replaced by a radically uneven distribution of power 
in favour of the West. 
 
The 19th century is thus close kin to the 20th and 21st centuries, and quite 
distinct from previous periods of world history.  
The marginalization of the global transformation in IR sets the 
discipline on tenuous foundations. Indeed, it can be argued that the 
current benchmark dates around which IR is organized omit the principal 
dynamics that established the modern international order (Buzan and 
Lawson, 2014a). These benchmarks usually include: the opening of the 
                                                 
6 As graphically shown by Diamond (1998), there were enormous differences of 
technology both within and across the agrarian era. This period witnessed major 
technological developments from iron and guns to clocks and windmills, and it was 
also a time of major ideational developments, most notably the advent of the Axial 
Age religions. But while the agrarian era was far from ‘static’, its pace of change was 
both slower and less compressed than the rapid, incessant change that has marked 
the period since the 19th century. The revolutions of modernity accelerated historical 
development. 
sea lanes from Europe to the Americas and the Indian Ocean in the late 
15th century (Buzan and Little, 2000: 401-2); the emergence of modern 
notions of sovereignty codified in the Treaty of Augsburg and, it is often 
argued, reaffirmed in the Peace of Westphalia (Spruyt, 1994; Ikenberry, 
2001; Philpott, 2001); the two World Wars and the Cold War as major 
contestations over world power during the 20th century (Lundestad, 
2005; Mayer, 2010); and the shake-up to dynamics of polarity initiated 
by the end of the Cold War (Mearsheimer, 1990; Waltz, 2000; Brooks 
and Wohlforth, 2008). These commonly held ‘turning points’ are not so 
much wrong as incomplete, under-theorized and cumulatively 
misleading (Buzan and Lawson, 2014a). They emphasize the 
distribution of power without focusing on the underlying mode of power. 
They pay little or no attention to changes in the density and 
connectedness of the international system. They focus on the impact of 
wars without examining the social developments that gave rise to them. 
And they omit the range of 19th century political, economic and 
ideological transformations that set in place core features of modern 
international relations. Once the magnitude of the changes initiated 
during the 19th century is recognized, it becomes clear that we are not 
living in a world where the principal dynamics are defined by the 
outcomes of 1500, 1648, 1919, 1945 or 1989. We are living now, and 
are likely to be living for some time yet, in a world defined predominantly 
by the downstream consequences of the 19th century global 
transformation. If IR is to gain a better grasp of its core areas of enquiry, 
this global transformation needs to become central to its field of vision.  
 
Establishing the Argument: Six Assumptions and Two Claims 
 
There are six main assumptions that underlie our claims. First, our 
understanding of the 19th century shares affinities to Eric Hobsbawm’s 
(1987: 8) concept of ‘the long 19th century’, sandwiched between the 
‘Atlantic Revolutions’ that began in America, France and Haiti on the one 
hand, and the First World War on the other. We include some aspects of 
modernity that were established during the late 18th century, but which 
matured principally in the 19th century (such as industrialization), and we 
also include some dynamics that are more associated with the early 
decades of the 20th century (such as changes in the organization of 
violence). As such, we use ‘the long 19th century’ as an analytical 
shorthand for a range of transformations that shaped the modern world. 
We show how much of IR’s contemporary agenda stems from these 
changes and what benefits would accrue to IR from making the global 
transformation more central to its enquiries.  
Second, as noted in the previous section, we understand the 
global transformation as constituted by three interlinked processes: 
industrialization, the rational state and ideologies of progress. By 
industrialization we mean both the commercialization of agriculture and 
the two-stage industrial revolution,7 which together generated an 
intensely connected global market. The extension of the market brought 
new opportunities for accumulating power, not least because of the 
close relationship between industrialization and dispossession. Indeed, 
industrialization in some states (such as Britain) was deeply interwoven 
with the forceful de-industrialization of others (such as India). By rational 
state-building, we mean the process by which administrative and 
bureaucratic competences were accumulated and ‘caged’ within national 
territories (Mann, 1988). This process was not pristine. Rather, as we 
show, processes rational state-building and imperialism were co-
implicated. Finally, by ‘ideologies of progress’, we mean systematic 
schemas of thought, specifically modern liberalism, socialism, 
nationalism and ‘scientific’ racism, which were rooted in ideals of 
progress and, in particular, associated with Enlightenment notions of 
classification, improvement and control. Once again, there was a dark 
side to these ideologies – the promise of progress was linked closely to 
a ‘standard of civilization’ which, along with ‘scientific’ racism, served as 
the legitimating currency for coercive practices against ‘barbarians’ 
(understood as peoples with an urban ‘high culture’) and ‘savages’ 
(understood as peoples without an urban ‘high culture’) (Gong, 1984; 
Keene, 2002; Anghie, 2004; Suzuki, 2009; Hobson, 2012). These three 
components of the global transformation were mutually reinforcing. For 
example, European colonialism was legitimized by one or more of the 
ideologies of progress, and enabled through military superiority, 
mechanisms of state control and infrastructural developments that had 
their roots in industrialization.  
Third, we emphasize the role played by inter-societal interactions 
in generating the global transformation. We reject the view that 
modernity was a uniquely European development arising from 
endogenous, self-generating civilizational qualities (e.g. Jones, 1981; 
Landes, 1998; North et al., 2009). We do so primarily on empirical 
grounds – as later chapters show, these claims do not stand up to 
scrutiny. At the same time, there seems little point replacing 
unsatisfactory Eurocentric approaches with equally unsatisfying Sino-
centric (e.g. Frank, 1998) or Eurasian-centric (e.g. Morris, 2013) 
explanations. Instead, we emphasize the ‘entangled histories’ and 
                                                 
7 The first stage was defined by iron and steam, the second by steel, electricity, 
chemicals, and internal combustion engines. Both stages are discussed in chapter 5.  
‘multiple vectors’ that combined to vault Western states into a position of 
pre-eminence (De Vries, 2013: 46). Specifically, we highlight the ways in 
which the configuration of modernity, constituted by inter-societal 
processes, cohered in parts of north-western Europe during the long 19th 
century and thereafter sustained a core-periphery global order. 
Modernity was a global process both in terms of origins and outcomes, 
hence our preferred term: global modernity. We use global modernity 
rather than alternatives such as ‘multiple modernities’ (Eisenstadt, 2000) 
for two reasons: first, because the latter retains a sense of Europe as the 
original, definitive modern experience – it is analytically prior to the 
regional variations that are compared to it; and second, because the 
concept of multiple modernities rests on a comparison of internally 
driven modernities, mediated by cultural differences, rather than deriving 
from the transnational interconnections that produced the modern mode 
of power (Bhambra, 2007: 65-72 and 2013: 301-3; see also Blumi, 
2012).  
Fourth, modernity should be seen as a protracted, uneven 
process rather than as a singular moment of sharp discontinuity – there 
is no hard-and-fast distinction to be made between modern and pre-
modern eras (Teschke, 2003: 43, 265). It is important to note that 
capitalism as a term did not attain wide currency until the 1860s, while 
agriculture, sailing ships and non-carbon based production remained 
important components of almost every economy deep into the 20th 
century. Many agrarian social hierarchies proved resilient – the nobility, 
gentry and landholding classes remained influential throughout the 19th 
century (Tombs, 2000: 30-1; Bayly, 2004: 451). And empires were not 
weakened but rebooted by the power differentials ushered in by the 
global transformation, remaining a central site of political authority up to, 
and in some cases beyond, the Second World War (Darwin, 2007; 
Burbank and Cooper, 2010: 20-1; Ballatyne and Burton, 2012: 285-6). In 
similar vein, we are not arguing that there was a single modern project 
that was instituted around the world, nor that modernity represents a 
necessary stage in a linear historical storyline, and still less that the 19th 
century contained a nascent ‘modernity formula’ that was waiting to be 
realised (Blumi, 2012: 4, 175). In many respects, our argument is the 
reverse of these claims – modernity was a contingent concatenation of 
social forces, a complex jumble of myriad events and processes. Once 
this concatenation had formed, it constituted a mode of power that 
contained massive transformative potential. This mode of power had 
deep roots, some of which went back centuries. But it was only in the 
19th century that the whole package coalesced in a small group of 
polities from where both its effect (a revolutionary configuration in the 
mode of power) and its challenge (how other societies responded to this 
configuration) became the principal dynamic through which international 
relations was conceived and practiced. As this book shows, these issues 
still define the basic structure of international relations and many of its 
principal issue-areas.  
Fifth, we argue that the global transformation can be 
characterized by both the intensification of differential development and 
heightened interactions between societies. In other words, particular 
experiences of the configuration we highlight were accentuated by 
increasingly dense connections between societies. The result was 
‘differential integration’ into global modernity (Halliday, 2002a). 
Intensified trade, improved transport and communication systems, and 
practices such as colonialism generated a denser, more integrated 
international order. As a consequence, levels of interdependence rose, 
making societies more exposed to developments elsewhere. However, 
during the 19th century, the development gap between societies opened 
more widely than ever before. Unevenness has always been a fact of 
historical development (Rosenberg, 2010), but never was unevenness 
experienced on this scale, with this intensity, or in a context of such 
close, inescapable interdependence. Those convinced of their cultural 
superiority and with access to advanced weapons, industrial production, 
medicine, and new forms of bureaucratic organization gained a 
pronounced advantage over those with limited access to these sources 
of power. After around 1800, these dynamics fostered a substantial 
power gap between a handful of ‘core’ polities and a much larger group 
of ‘peripheral’ polities. In principle, this power gap could be closed: those 
with access to the configuration that sustained the global transformation 
could move from periphery to core. In practice, this move was made 
exceptionally difficult not only by the depth of the transformative 
package, but also by practices of imperialism and other forms of 
coercive interventionism that reinforced the advantages of the core. The 
result was the formation of a core-periphery international order in which 
the leading edge was located in the West. This hierarchical international 
order lasted from the early 19th century until the early years of the 21st 
century. In the contemporary world, it is being replaced by a more 
decentred global order in which those states that were once on the 
receiving end of the global transformation are employing its mode of 
power to reassert their position in international society. 
Finally, we do not use the terms ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ along the 
lines popularized by world systems analysts, i.e. as an ‘axial division of 
labour’ premised on unequal exchange between a low profit, high-
competition, labour-intensive periphery and a high profit, quasi-
monopolistic, capital-intensive core (Wallerstein, 2011a: xiv). First, we 
see the dividing line between core and periphery as premised on access 
to the entire modern configuration of power (industrialization, rational 
statehood and ideologies of progress) rather than just one aspect of it. 
Second, Wallerstein’s view is too homogenising: there are peripheries in 
the core and cores in the periphery – the geography of capitalism is 
lumpier than Wallerstein and his colleagues allow (Galtung, 1971). Third, 
we do not follow world systems analysts in seeing historical 
development as a cycle or wave, lasting roughly 50 years, in which 
capitalist accumulation goes through certain elemental stages: 
monopoly, competition, falling prices, reduced profits, stagnation, 
geographical relocation, incorporation of resistance, and the emergence 
of new monopolies (Wallerstein, 2011a: xiv). This analytic is premised 
on a reproductive logic (a system of permanently unequal exchange in 
which surplus value is transferred from the periphery to the core) that 
has difficulty explaining movement from the periphery to the core, a 
process that, as we note above, is a central feature of contemporary 
international relations. Finally, in contrast to world systems theorists, our 
use of ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ is analytical rather than explanatory – we 
deploy these terms to delineate polities according to their relationship to 
the modern mode of power. This allows us to capture the central 
features of the core-periphery international order that emerged during 
the long 19th century and chart its partial erosion over recent decades.  
These six assumptions produce two main claims. First, a set of 
dynamics established during the 19th century intertwined in a powerful 
configuration that reshaped the basis of international order in such a way 
as to define a new era. Second, this order not only transformed 
international relations during the long 19th century, it also underpins core 
aspects of contemporary international relations. As such, our contention 
is that the global transformation is central to understanding both the 
emergence of modern international relations and the principal features of 
contemporary international order. If this claim stands up, then IR needs 
to rethink many of its principal areas of interest and reconsider how it 
defines much of its contemporary agenda. As we show in the chapters 
that follow, many central concerns of the discipline, from dynamics of 
war-making to debates about the changing character of sovereignty, 
have their roots in the global transformation. Marginalizing modernity 




Our argument unfolds in three sections. The first section 
establishes the foundations for the book as a whole. In chapter 1, we 
outline the principal features of the global transformation, showing how 
industrialization, the emergence of rational states and ideologies of 
progress transformed the structure of international order during the long 
19th century. This chapter also provides the basis for our claim that core 
aspects of contemporary international relations can be understood as an 
ongoing working-out of dynamics unleashed during this period. Our aim 
is not to make a novel theoretical argument regarding the causes of the 
global transformation – that would require a different book. Rather, we 
use scholarship in economic history, world history and historical 
sociology to build a composite picture of the global transformation, 
focusing on the ways in which its nexus of intertwined dynamics served 
to drive the development of modern international relations. We do not 
introduce these literatures as parallel tracks or providers of diverting 
background material. Rather, we synthesize these fields of enquiry, 
explicitly linking debates in IR to those in cognate disciplines. The result 
is a shared conversation about how to conceptualize, historicize and 
theorize global modernity. 
Chapter 2 examines the ways in which IR scholarship currently 
approaches the 19th century. It is not our claim that all IR scholarship 
ignores the 19th century – it is relatively easy to find work that refers to 
the Concert of Europe or to the rise of the firm, and which interrogates 
the thought of 19th century figures such as Clausewitz, Marx and 
Nietzsche. However, for the most part, the global transformation is 
treated in one of three ways: as an absence; as a point of data 
accumulation; or as a fragment in a wider research program. As such, 
our intervention is motivated by the failure of IR as a discipline to 
understand the 19th century as home to a systemic transformation. We 
examine the reasons for this lacuna and establish why it creates 
difficulties for effective theorization of both the emergence and 
institutionalization of modern international relations.  
The second section of the book provides the empirical ballast for 
our theoretical claims. Each chapter looks at a particular meme 
associated with international relations, in order to: a) show how this 
issue was transformed by 19th century developments and; b) trace the 
downstream effects of this transformation to the present day. The aim of 
these chapters is to highlight principal storylines and key processes that 
are crucial to how we think about international relations. In other words, 
we develop an analytical narrative that illustrates the significance of 19th 
century processes to 20th and 21st century international relations. Such 
an enterprise necessarily simplifies detail and compresses complexity. 
We make no attempt to compete with area studies and issue experts, or 
with those who carry out fine-tuned, granular historical analysis. There 
are, as there always must be in an exercise of this kind, historical gaps 
in our account. Our contribution is the overview itself, which we see as 
providing stronger foundations for the discipline than any currently 
provided.  
Chapter 3 focuses on the ‘shrinking of the planet’, which many 
globalization theorists link to 20th century changes in finance, trade, 
communication technologies and global governance. We show how 
these modern forms of interaction capacity not only originated in 19th 
century developments, but also had dramatic impacts on international 
relations at the time. We then chart their ongoing impact on the 
contemporary international order. Chapter 4 examines the emergence of 
modern ideologies of progress – liberalism, nationalism, socialism and 
‘scientific’ racism – again unpacking their 19th century origins and 
highlighting their role in the formation of contemporary international 
order. Chapter 5 explores the ways in which polities were transformed 
during the global transformation, rooting the development of rational 
states in the intensification of imperialism, the revolutionary challenge, 
and the relationship between states and markets. Chapters 6 and 7 
discuss the emergence, development and partial erosion of a 
distinctively modern core-periphery international order. Chapter 6 
examines the establishment of extreme inequality between core and 
periphery during the 19th century and explores the ways in which 
elements of this inequality have been sustained during the 20th and 21st 
centuries. Chapter 7 looks at how, when and where the gap between 
core and periphery has narrowed or closed, particularly since 1945. 
Chapter 8 turns to the specific issue of how the global transformation 
impacted on great powers and their interrelations, and how this carried 
through to contemporary international relations by transforming the 
nature and utility of war.  
The final section of the book is made up of two chapters that focus 
on the implications of our argument. Chapter 9 studies the ways in which 
our argument both disrupts and adds value to contemporary debates in 
international relations, including reassessment of the proposed power 
shift from the Atlantic region to Asia, the competition between varieties 
of capitalist states, and the possibility of a world without superpowers. 
Our argument is that the trajectory of the revolutions of modernity has 
been from a 19th and 20th century world of ‘centred globalism’ to one of 
‘decentred globalism’. Contemporary international order is highly 
globalized. But the power gap that marked international relations over 
the past two hundred years is beginning to close – international order is 
becoming increasingly decentred. Decentred globalism provides a 
foundation for international affairs quite unlike the core-periphery global 
order of the past two centuries. It also provides a backdrop quite unlike 
the world before the 19th century, in which there were many centres of 
power, but these were only lightly connected with each other. Chapter 9 
surveys the main dynamics that sustain a world of decentred globalism.  
The book’s final chapter outlines the consequences of our 
argument for IR as a discipline. It notes the ways in which a fuller 
understanding of the global transformation reshapes the ways that the 
discipline should think about six issue-areas: power, security, 
globalization, ideational structure, periodization, and history. It concludes 
by looking at how a fuller engagement with the global transformation 
affects IR’s self-understanding as a discipline. 
 
 
